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In recent years, the frequent adjustment of the government’s economic 
policies and the uncertainty of foreign economic situations have made 
the degree of uncertainty of China’s economic policies rise continuous-
ly. The increasing degree of policy uncertainty will inevitably affect 
the investment and financing decisions of micro enterprises. Then, how 
does economic policy uncertainty (EPU) affect mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) behavior? What’s the mechanism? Based on the above ques-
tions, this paper uses the data of non-financial listed companies in the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2008 to 2018 as a sample 
to explore the relationship between EPU and M&A. The study shows 
that rising EPU will promote corporate M&A behavior, and this effect 
is more significant in slow-growth companies. The relationship between 
EPU and M&A is affected by corporate governance, stock price volatil-
ity and financing constraints. Specifically, the company’s M&A size is 
more sensitive to EPU with higher level of corporate governance, high-
er level of stock price volatility, and lesser financing constraints. Further 
research shows that the rise of EPU will significantly promote the im-
provement of M&A performance in the short-term, but this effect does 
not exist in the long-term. Various robustness checks do not change the 
empirical results of this paper. 
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1. Introduction
As an important means for the allocation of storage resources in the capital market, M&A plays an important role in promoting corporate strategic 
adjustment, resource integration and industrial upgrad-
ing. At the micro level, M&A have reallocated resources 
from low-productivity to high-productivity enterprises, 
and achieve cost reduction and efficiency improvement 
through the reorganization of resources within and be-
tween industries. According to statistics, the size of M&A 
deals of China’s listed companies is on the rise as a whole 
since 2000. In 2018 alone, there were 6,283 new M&A 
deals with a total value of RMB180 million, a year-on-
year increase of 2.7%. As a way of corporate develop-
ment, M&A can optimize resource allocation, improve 
corporate performance and expand investment scale to a 
certain extent. However, problems such as the stock price 
crash risk caused by M&A and aggravated financial mar-
ket volatility have also gradually highlighted. Through the 
integration and reorganization of resources among corpo-
rate departments, M&A can bring economy of scale, econ-
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omy of scope or synergies, so as to increase enterprise 
value and improve efficiency; at the sector level, M&A 
can reallocate resources within and between industries, 
achieve the goals of industry integration, industrial re-
structuring and upgrading in the case of high requirement 
for market access for different industries. At the national 
level, finding new economic growth points and preventing 
systematic financial risks are important economic issues 
in macro-finance in China. With China’s economic growth 
entering a “new normal” stage, problems such as the 
shrinking market demand, high leverage ratio and the “liv-
ing dead” of zombie companies have gradually become 
noticeable. 
China’s supply-side structural reform plays an active 
role in transforming the growth mode, optimizing the 
economic structure, and alleviating distortion of resource 
allocation. As the main method of resource allocation in 
the capital market, M&A have become an important task 
for the capital market to serve the national strategic ad-
justment and the real economy.
After the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008, 
China issued a series of fiscal policies, monetary policies 
and industrial policies to mitigate the negative impact of 
foreign economic recession on China’s macro economy. 
As an important means of macro-control by government, 
economic policies, while adjusting investment structure, 
optimizing industrial structure, and improving the insti-
tutional environment, will also have an impact on the ex-
ternal operating environment of enterprises, which in turn 
affects micro-enterprise investment, R&D innovation, 
financial asset allocation, business credit supply and the 
analysts’ earnings forecasts revisions [1-5]. The data of Bak-
er et al. show that China’s EPU level has been on the rise 
since 2012, which may be related to a series of policies 
that have been withdrawn in recent years [6]. On the one 
hand, the credit tight of commercial banks and the herd 
behavior of outside investors caused by the rise in EPU 
reduced the size of M&A deals by increasing the financ-
ing costs and operating risks of enterprises; on the other 
hand, while the rise of EPU brings more uncertainty to the 
investment and financing activities of enterprises, it also 
means that companies will achieve greater future benefits 
through industrial transformation, resource integration and 
seizing market share through R&D and innovation, M&A. 
In view of the above two diametrically opposed mech-
anisms, this paper attempts to explore this issue, using 
data from non-financial listed companies to empirically 
analyze the impact of EPU on M&A. This study attempts 
to reveal the impact of rising EPU on the size of M&A 
deals and M&A performance, with a view to revealing the 
mechanism of macroeconomic policies on the behavioral 
mechanism of micro-enterprises, and thus provide theoret-
ical support and reference for the formulation and imple-
mentation of economic policies of the government sector.
Previous researches on M&A mostly focused on the 
motivation, influencing factors and economic effects of 
M&A. In terms of motivation of M&A, M&A can help 
improve the cooperative effect of enterprises by integrat-
ing the resources of both parties, which is reflected in the 
synergistic effects of management, finance, and operation 
[7]. M&A, as an important way to restructure resources in 
the capital market, is motivated by the stages of industry 
evolution[8]. In terms of influence factors and econom-
ic consequences, government intervention and political 
connections will act on M&A, and local officials will 
intervene in M&A activities to achieve specific political 
goals in consideration of social stability factors such as in-
creasing real investment efficiency and employment rates. 
This leads to the phenomenon of “M&A performance par-
adox”. Furthermore, the director ties will also affect the 
probability of successful M&A deals through business due 
diligence and value assessment mechanisms. Regional 
informal regulations will also increase the value of M&A 
deals by suppressing opportunistic behaviors among trans-
action subjects, and reducing the uncertainty of M&A. In 
addition, cultural differences between enterprises will also 
increase the difficulty of cultural financing for both sides 
of M&A and thus have a negative impact on M&A perfor-
mance.
Regarding the impact of EPU on corporate behavior, 
scholars at home and abroad have also conducted a thor-
ough research. Some scholars have found that under the 
influence of real options theory and financial frictions, 
the rise of EPU will discourage business investment [1,4,9]. 
EPU will also have an impact on cash holding levels, risk 
exposure and technological innovation [3,10,11]. However, 
few studies have revealed the relationship between EPU 
and M&A. On the one hand, the rise of EPU implies that 
the uncertainty of the business environment and banks’ 
reluctance to lend have increased, weakening the syner-
gistic effect caused by M&A, thereby inhibiting the size 
of M&A deals; on the other hand, the rise of EPU means 
that investors are more sensitive to the released negative 
information, and more inclined to “vote with their feet”. 
The uncertainty of the financial market and the herd effect 
of investors imply that the value of some enterprises is 
underestimated, which make large-scale enterprises with 
strong anti-risk ability have motivation to expand oper-
ations, acquire patent technology and transform through 
M&A. However, there is a lack of EPU’s in-depth analy-
sis of M&A’s influencing mechanism. In view of this, this 
paper intends to make up for the deficiency of existing 
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literature and empirically analyze the effect of EPU on 
M&A behavior.
This paper uses the data of non-financial listed com-
panies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 
2008 to 2018 to empirically analyze the impact of rising 
EPU on M&A. Specifically, this paper firstly explains 
the mechanism of EPU’s rise on M&A theoretically, and 
proposes alternative hypotheses. Then, it analyzes the 
regulatory mechanisms of corporate governance, stock 
price fluctuations and financing constraints between EPU 
and M&A. Finally, it further discusses the impact of rising 
EPU on M&A performance. Compared with the existing 
research, our research contributes to the literature in three 
important ways. Firstly, our study breaks away from the 
traditional research, which is confined to study the impact 
of EPU’s impact on corporate R&D investment, financial 
asset allocation, and cash holdings and reveals the effect 
of EPU’s rise on M&A; secondly, our study analyzes the 
relationship between EPU and M&A, and find heteroge-
neous effects in companies with different levels of corpo-
rate governance, stock price volatility, and financing con-
straints; thirdly, it further explores the impact of the rising 
EPU on M&A performance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: We 
present literature review and research hypothesis in Sec-
tion II. Section III develops empirical predictions. Section 
IV presents empirical results. Section V further discusses 
the influence of EPU on M&A performance, and section 
VI concludes and put forward policy suggestions.
2. Literature Review and Research Hypothesis
2.1 EPU and M&A
The influencing mechanism of EPU on corporate invest-
ment and financing activities has always been the focus 
of domestic and foreign scholars. The introduction and 
adjustment of government fiscal, monetary, and indus-
trial policies make it impossible for economic entities to 
predict with certainty whether, when and how the govern-
ment will change the current economic policy [1], which 
in turn will affect behaviors of micro-firms [6,12]. As an im-
portant way of enterprise resource allocation, M&A also 
belong to the category of corporate investment behavior. 
From the perspective of the influencing mechanism, first, 
the rising EPU will increase the option value of M&A 
delay decisions [4,9], and reduce the positive effect of scale 
economy and scope economy caused by M&A activities 
on corporate performance, thus inhibiting M&A moti-
vation. Second, the rise of EPU will also aggravate the 
phenomenon of banks’ reluctance to lend, increase the dif-
ficulty of external financing, and amplify financial market 
fluctuations[3], thereby restraining the size of M&A deals 
at the capital level. Third, frequent adjustments of gov-
ernment economic policies and rising uncertainties in for-
eign financial market conditions will also make external 
investors become more sensitive to the release of negative 
news. Once institutional investors have a negative attitude 
towards M&A deals, it inevitably means that the market 
performance after M&A will be worse due to the herd be-
havior of outside investors and the “voting-with-their-feet” 
behavior, thereby weakening the willingness of M&A. 
Therefore, the rise in EPU may inhibit M&A activities.
The increase in policy uncertainty is often accompa-
nied by the improvement of the difficulty for external in-
vestors to supervise the management, which will promote 
the tendency of excessive investment and self-interested 
behavior of the management [13]. Specifically, managerial 
compensation usually depends on the firm size. During 
periods of high EPU, managers may expand the firm size 
and improve the non-monetary benefits through M&A 
deals, and attribute the adverse impact of M&A to policy 
changes, so as to avoid the board’s punishment mecha-
nism for their poor management. In addition, the elevation 
of EPU levels has increased the difficulty of external fi-
nancing and operational risks for enterprises, and enter-
prises are more inclined to achieve financial synergy and 
operational diversification through M&A. Based on the 
above viewpoints, this paper proposes two alternative hy-
potheses:
H1a: The rise of EPU will inhibit M&A activities.
H1b: The rise of EPU will promote M&A activities.
2.2 Heterogeneous Effects of EPU on M&A
The problem of information asymmetry between an ac-
quirer and a target company often causes problems such 
as “free-riding”, cultural conflicts and reverse allocation 
of resources in the M&A process[14,15]. A good corporate 
governance environment will help the integration of vari-
ous resources between the acquirer and the acquired party, 
inhibit the opportunistic behavior of managers, and pro-
mote the rapid integration of differentiated cultures, there-
by improving M&A performance. Corporate governance 
is an important means to ensure enterprises to operate 
effectively, prevent risks of assets, and achieve business 
management objectives. The study found that internal 
control can effectively improve the risk prevention capa-
bilities of M&A activities so as to ensure the smooth prog-
ress of M&A activities and the realization of synergistic 
effects [16]. The M&A deal value is jointly determined by 
the value of the acquirer and the target company, and the 
value realization of both parties depends on the perfection 
of the internal control system. Therefore, compared with 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jesr.v3i4.2413
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companies with poor corporate governance levels, the 
positive impact of the rising EPU on M&A is stronger in 
companies with sound corporate governance. In view of 
this, the second research hypothesis is proposed:
H2: The positive impact of the EPU on M&A is more 
significant in enterprises with a higher level of corporate 
governance.
In the securities markets, the signal transmission mech-
anism of stock value will promote the optimal allocation 
of resources. Compared with mature capital markets, the 
stock price of emerging market countries contains a lot 
of noise, so that the stock price cannot well reflect the 
fundamentals information of a company, and it is difficult 
to play the guiding role of resource allocation [17]. China’s 
securities market has always been regarded as a “policy 
market”, and macroeconomic information has an im-
portant impact on stock price changes. EPU significantly 
increases the volatility of corporate stock prices and the 
asymmetric relation between the stock market and macro-
economic dynamics [5,18]. Under the influence of informa-
tion asymmetry, market incompleteness makes corporate 
value being misestimated more frequently. Compared 
with companies with more stable stock market perfor-
mance, the increase in EPU makes external investors have 
a stronger tendency to overreact to enterprises with a high 
level of stock price volatility. Therefore, enterprises with a 
high level of stock price volatility make external financing 
internalized through M&A, diversify operations, boost 
investors’ confidence, and have a stronger willingness to 
transform and upgrade their industries. As a result, the 
rising EPU will have a more significant promoting effect 
on M&A in such enterprises. In view of this, this paper 
proposes a third hypothesis:
H3: The positive impact of rising EPU on M&A is 
more significant in companies with a higher level of stock 
price volatility.
EPU acts on the investment decision-making behav-
ior of enterprises through two channels: the degree of 
financing constraints and the availability of financing [19]. 
EPU means that the risk of loan is higher, and financial 
intermediaries will further allocate funds to state-owned 
and large-scale enterprises with implicit government 
guarantees and strong anti-risk capabilities to balance risk 
and return, thereby exacerbating credit differentiation [20]. 
Specifically, SOEs and large-scale enterprises have strong 
financing advantages, and they can raise sufficient funds 
from the capital market and banks, or even more money 
than is necessary for their operations, while private enter-
prises and small-scale enterprises are difficult to obtain 
financing from formal financial institutions. Companies 
that are subject to strong financing constraints can hardly 
absorb the funds needed for M&A from outside. Compa-
nies that are subject to weak financing constraints have 
relatively abundant funds and stronger motivation to en-
gage in M&A. Therefore, this paper proposes hypothesis 4:
H4: The positive impact of the rising EPU on M&A 
is more significant in enterprises with less financial con-
straints
3. Empirical Design and Data
3.1 Sample Selection and Data Sources
This paper takes the M&A events of A-shares that are 
listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchang-
es from 2008 to 2018 as samples of initial research, 
and selects the samples of M&A events as follows: (1) 
M&A events in which the M&A transactions take place 
in the place of buyer; (2) Only successful transactions 
are retained; (3) Samples of related-party transactions 
are excluded; (4) Samples of M&A deals inn ST and the 
financial industry are excluded. Regarding EPU, we use 
the indices measured by Baker et al. (2016) based on key-
word search over the South China Morning Post, which 
is, proportion of related reports with four keywords of 
“China”, “Economy”, “Uncertainty” and “Policy” in the 
total number of articles of the current month. Both M&A 
transaction data and corporate financial data come from 
China Stock Market & Accounting Research Database 
(CSMAR). In order to eliminate the interference of ex-
treme values on empirical analysis, continuous variables 
are winsorized at level 1% at the firm level.
3.2 Empirical Design and Variable Definitions
To explore the impact of rising EPU on M&A, we con-
struct the following empirical models:
MAi t t i t i t i t, , ,= + + + + +α β ρ µ δ εEPU X  (1)
Wherein, the subscript i represents an enterprise and 
t represents the year. The independent variable MA rep-
resents the M&A behavior of the listed company i in year 
t, which is measured by the natural logarithm of the total 
value of all M&A deals of the company this year plus one. 
EPU stands for economic policy uncertainty, which is the 
core independent variable of this paper, and is measured 
by the twelve-month average of the year (divided by 100). 
If the estimated value of β is significantly less than 0, it 
indicates that the EPU will inhibit M&A activities (H1a); 
on the contrary, if the estimated value of β is significant-
ly greater than 0, it indicates that the EPU will promote 
M&A activities (H1b).
Xi,t refers to a series of control variables, including oth-
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jesr.v3i4.2413
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er factors that affect M&A. We use the financial and en-
tity’s relative rate of return (Return_Gap), which is mea-
sured by the ratio of financial rate of return to the entity’s 
rate of return; financial and entity’s relative risk (Risk_
Gap), which is measured by the ratio of three-quarter 
rolling standard deviation of financial rate of return and 
the entity’s rate of return. In addition, we also use controls 
variables such as firm size (Size), free cash flow (CF), To-
bin’Q (TobinQ), financial leverage (Lev), return on assets 
(ROA), and corporate growth (Salesgrowth).
μi refers to the firm’s fixed effects, which is used to 
capture the individual consistent characteristics of the firm 
that does not change over time, so as to reduce the impact 
of omitted variables on the empirical results. δt represents 
time fixed effects. ε(i,t) is the unobserved residual. In a re-
gression analysis, this paper uses cluster-robust standard 
errors to cluster the standard errors to the enterprise level. 
The detailed variable measurement is shown in Table 1.
To further examine the impact of EPU on M&A in 
companies with different levels of corporate governance, 
stock price volatility, and financing constraints, we in-
troduce the interactions between EPU and the aforemen-
tioned regulated variables based on the baseline regression 
model (1), and construct a regression model as shown in 
equation (2).
MA  i t t t i t i t i t i i t, , , , ,= + + × + + + +α β γ δ ρ µ εEPU EPU MV MV X
 (2)
Wherein, MVi,t represents the regulated variable of 
enterprise i in period t. Specifically, we use a dummy 
variable CGit measuring corporate governance levels, a 
dummy variable VIXi,t measuring the level of stock price 
volatility, and KZ index measuring financing constraints 
(ConFKZi,t), and solvency ratio (ConFSyi,t) to interact with 
EPU index EPUt.
Wherein, for the measurement of corporate governance 
levels, we use shareholding proportion of executives and 
the nature of corporate ownership. Specifically, if the 
shareholding proportion of executives is greater than the 
median level of the same industry in the same year, it is 
set as a company with a higher level of governance, that 
is, CG_CEOSHR=1, otherwise, it is assigned a value of 
0. The second method reflects the corporate governance 
based on the nature of corporate ownership. It is general-
ly believed that non-state-owned enterprises have better 
corporate governance than SOEs. Therefore, if it is a non-
state-owned enterprise, CG_CEOSHR=1; if it is a SOE, 
the value is 0. In model (2), if the coefficient on the inter-
action term between EPU and corporate governance levels 
is significantly positive, it means that the rise of EPU will 
have a stronger role in promoting the size of M&A deals 
with a higher level of corporate governance, that is, hy-
pothesis 2 holds.
Similarly, to examine how the relationship between 
EPU and M&A is affected by a company’s level of stock 
price volatility, we add the interaction term between 
EPU and level of stock price volatility to the benchmark 
model. Specifically, we use the three-year stock price 
volatility (VIX) before M&A to reflect the level of stock 
price volatility. If the stock price volatility is greater than 
the median of the same industry in the same year, the 
value of VIX is 1, otherwise the value is 0. We use the 
KZ index [21] and the solvency ratio to reflect the degree 
of financing constraints. Specifically, if the KZ index 
is larger and the solvency ratio is smaller, it indicates 
that the degree of financing constraints is greater. If the 
interaction term between EPU and KZ index (EPUt×-
ConFKZi,t) is significantly negative, and the coefficient 
on the interaction term between EPU and solvency ratio 
(EPUt×ConFSYi,t) is significantly positive, it indicates 
that the rising EPU has a positive impact on size of 
M&A deals, which is even greater in companies with 
less financing constraints.
Table 1. Variable Definitions
Variables Description Estimating method
MA Value of M&A
Natural logarithm of the total value of 
all M&A deals of the company this year 
plus one
MAD Whether M&A or not
The acquired company is assigned the 
value 1, otherwise it is 0
EPU EPU Arithmetic average of the twelve months of the year/100
Size Company size Natural logarithm of total assets
CF Free cash flow Free cash flow/total assets
TobinQ Tobin’s Q Market value/total assets
Lev Financial lever-age (%) Total liabilities/total assets
ROA ROA (%) Net profit/total assets
Salesg Corporate growth (%)
Operating income of the current period / 













Ratio of three-quarter rolling standard 
deviation of financial rate of return and 






An indicator that equals 1 if shareholding 
proportion of executives is greater than 
the median level of the same industry in 









Journal of Economic Science Research | Volume 03 | Issue 04 | October 2020
Distributed under creative commons license 4.0
VIX Level of stock price volatility
An indicator that equals 1 if the stock 
price volatility is greater than the median 
of the same industry in the same year, 
and 0 otherwise






4. Analysis of Empirical Results
4.1 Baseline Regression
Table 2 reports the regression results of the impact of 
EPU on M&A. Where, columns (2) and (4) control the 
fixed effects on the basis of the columns (1) and (3) 
respectively. The results show that in columns (1) and 
(2), the EPU coefficients are 1.1530 and 2.0467, respec-
tively, which are both statistically significant at the 1% 
level. This shows that the EPU has a positive impact on 
the size of M&A deals. Considering that size of M&A 
deals are affected by variables of other enterprise-level, 
columns (3) and (4) in the table further control variables 
such as firm size, free cash flow, leverage ratio, ROA, 
growth, financial and entity’s relative rate of return and 
relative risk. The fixed-effect model shows that after 
adding control variables at an enterprise level, the coeffi-
cient of EPU (EPU) is still statistically significant at the 
1% level, therefore, H1b holds. 
Table 2. EPU and M&A
Dependent 
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MA MA MA MA
EPU 1.1530*** 2.0467*** 0.9619*** 1.1792***
(0.044) (0.097) (0.053) (0.125)
N 26,196 26,196 26,196 26,196
R2 0.032 0.069 0.040 0.083
Control 
Variables No No Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the industry level, which 
are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively, the same 
as below. Due to space limitations, regression coefficients of control 
variables are not reported in this paper. See the appendix for details, the 
same as below.
The impact of EPU on M&A behavior may also be 
related to the stage of a company. Generally speaking, 
companies at a start-up stage have more investment op-
portunities, greater potential for growth, and insufficient 
idle money [22]. However, as companies enter the stage of 
large-scale production, their market share has gradually 
expanded, capital sources have stabilized, and external 
investment opportunities and industry development mo-
mentum have weakened. Companies in the maturity stage 
are more inclined to acquire companies with good growth 
potential, financing difficulties, and in emerging industries 
for the purpose of expanding production, resource integra-
tion and industrial transformation. Therefore, EPU may 
have heterogeneous effects on M&A depending on the 
stage of enterprise growth.
Table 3. EPU and M&A: Sub-sample Test According to 
the Growth of Enterprises
Dependent 
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MA MA MA MA





EPU 0.7583*** 1.0621*** 0.7244*** 1.5188***
(0.079) (0.078) (0.191) (0.174)
N 12,876 12,856 12,876 12,856
R2 0.025 0.051 0.060 0.092
Control Vari-
ables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes
To further investigate the heterogeneous effects of the 
rising EPU on size of M&A deals, we will run a sub-sam-
ple regression according to the growth rate of main busi-
ness revenue higher or lower than the median of the year 
and the industry. The empirical results are shown in Table 
3. The first two columns in the table give the regression 
results of the fixed effects of uncontrol years, showing 
that the EPU coefficient is 1.0621 in the mature period 
and is statistically significant at the 1% level, which is 
higher than the EPU coefficient (0.7583) of enterprises in 
the start-up period. It can be seen that the positive impact 
of EPU on M&A is more significant in companies during 
the maturity stage. Columns (3) and (4) in the table further 
give the regression results after controlling the year fixed 
effects, and the results have not changed.
4.2 Analysis of Moderating Effect  
(1) The moderating effect of corporate governance. To 
further verify the moderating effect of corporate gover-
nance levels on EPU and M&A, we introduce the interac-
tion terms between corporate governance levels and EPU 




Journal of Economic Science Research | Volume 03 | Issue 04 | October 2020
Distributed under creative commons license 4.0
Table 4. EPU, Corporate Governance and M&A
Dependent 
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MA MA MA MA
EPU 0.7113*** 0.9919*** 0.3738*** 0.7843***












N 26,196 26,196 26,196 26,196
R2 0.043 0.085 0.046 0.087
Control 
Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 4 are the regression re-
sults with the shareholding proportion of executives as 
a proxy variable. The results show that the interaction 
term (CG_CEOSHR*EPU) between the dummy variable 
of executives’ shareholding proportion and EPU is sta-
tistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that the 
improvement of corporate governance levels will magnify 
the positive relationship between EPU and size of M&A 
deals. We change the method of measuring the corporate 
governance levels and divide the corporate governance 
levels according to the nature of corporate ownership. The 
results show that the coefficient of CG_SOE*EPU inter-
action term is still statistically significant at the 1% level 
after adopting the nature of corporate ownership as the 
proxy indicator of corporate governance levels, and the 
conclusions are consistent, that is, hypothesis 2 is verified.
(2) The moderating effect of stock price volatility. To 
further examine the impact of level of stock price volatil-
ity on the dynamic relationship between EPU and M&A, 
we introduce a dummy variable VIX for the level of stock 
price volatility three years before M&A, and multiplies 
it with EPU. The regression results are shown in Table 
5. Columns (1) and (2) use the reinvestment rate without 
considering cash dividends to measure the stock price 
volatility, and columns (3) and (4) use the reinvestment 
rate considering cash dividends to measure the stock price 
volatility. The results in the table show that regardless of 
whether the time fixed effect is controlled, the interaction 
term VIX*EPU between level of stock price volatility and 
EPU is statistically significant at the 1% level. It can be 
seen that the increase in level of stock price volatility will 
amplify the positive correlation between EPU and M&A, 
and the H3 holds.
Table 5. EPU, Stock Price Volatility and M&A
Dependent 
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MA MA MA MA
EPU 0.5469*** 0.7563*** 0.5273*** 0.6969***
(0.075) (0.142) (0.078) (0.145)
VIX*EPU 0.3164*** 0.2462** 0.3419*** 0.2760***
(0.102) (0.100) (0.106) (0.104)
VIX -0.3199 -0.2252 -0.3484 -0.2633
(0.263) (0.260) (0.277) (0.273)
N 20,002 20,002 18,567 18,567
R2 0.020 0.048 0.019 0.046
Control 
Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes
(3) Moderating effect of financing constraints. We in-
troduce the interaction term between the proxy indicators 
of the financing constraints and the EPU to investigate 
the heterogeneous effects of the rising EPU on the M&A 
behavior with different levels of financing constraints. 
The empirical results are shown in Table 6. In columns 
(1) and (2) of the table, the coefficient on the interaction 
term between EPU and KZ index is significantly negative 
at the 1% level, indicating that the EPU has a positive 
effect on size of M&A deals in companies with less fi-
nancial constraints. The positive impact of size of M&A 
deals is stronger. In columns (3) and (4) of the table, the 
coefficient of the interaction term between EPU and the 
solvency ratio is significantly positive. The results show 
that reduction in financing constraints will magnify the ef-
fect of EPU on the size of M&A deals, that is, Hypothesis 
4 holds.
Table 6. EPU, Financing Constraints and M&A
Dependent Vari-
able
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MA MA MA MA
EPU 1.4729*** 1.6310*** 0.8410*** 1.0298***
(0.106) (0.157) (0.065) (0.131)
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N 26,196 26,196 26,196 26,196
R2 0.042 0.084 0.041 0.084
Control Vari-
ables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes
4.3 Robustness Checks
(1) Replace the kernel variables 
In this paper, we use M&A dummy variable M&AD as 
the independent variable in the robustness checks. If the 
company has M&A deals for the current year, M&AD is 
assigned a value of 1, and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, this 
paper uses the Logit model to regress the reference model, 
and the results are shown in Table 7. The first two col-
umns in the table do not control other control variables, 
and the last two columns in the table control all control 
variables. The results show that regardless of whether the 
year fixed effects are controlled or not, the coefficient of 
EPU is significantly positive at the 1% level, and the pre-
vious conclusions are still valid.
Table 7. Alternative dependent variables
Dependent 
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MAD MAD MAD MAD
EPU 0.1832*** 0.3781*** 0.2002*** 0.3910***
(0.010) (0.023) (0.010) (0.024)
N 26,196 26,196 26,196 26,196
R2 0.094 0.0336 0.0186 0.0446
Control 
Variables No No Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes
We further change the measuring method of EPU, tak-
ing the EPU index in December at the end of the year as a 
proxy indicator of the EPU of the current year. The results 
show that after replacing the core independent variables, 
the EPU coefficient is still statistically significant at the 
1% level, which is consistent with the baseline regression 
results, namely, rising EPU promotes M&A activities.
Table 8. Replace the Measurement Method of EPU Index
Dependent 
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MA MA MA MA
EPU_12M 0.6040*** 0.8199*** 0.5482*** 0.4724***
(0.018) (0.039) (0.020) (0.050)
N 26,196 26,196 26,196 26,196
R2 0.048 0.069 0.057 0.083
Control 
Variables No No Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes
(2) Endogenous problems. To further investigate the 
impact of model endogenous problems on the empirical 
results, the method of instrumental variables (IVs) is used 
to regress the reference model. Regarding the selection 
of instrumental variables, Wang et al. believe that macro-
economic fluctuations such as interest rates and exchange 
rates in emerging countries are related to the introduction 
and changes of the US monetary policy. Considering that 
the economic policy uncertainty of US only affects the 
innovation activities of enterprises by influencing the 
EPU in China, therefore, the first instrumental variable 
in this paper is the US EPU index as the instrumental 
variable for China’s EPU. Taking into account that the 
EPU of other major economies will also affect China’s 
EPU through trade channels, which in turn will affect the 
investment and financing behavior of China’s companies, 
we use the global EPU index and the EPU index weighted 
by the trade share of major trading countries of China as 
the second and third instrumental variables. Specifically, 
seven countries, namely the United States, Japan, South 
Korea, The United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy, 
are selected in this paper. The proportion of import-export 
volume of these countries is taken as the weight, and the 
EPU index of China’s major trading countries is obtained 




(1) (2) (3) (4)
MA MA MA MA
EPU 0.8970*** 6.4008*** 1.3289*** 6.4008***
(0.053) (0.196) (0.089) (0.196)
N 26,096 26,096 26,096 26,096
R2 0.040 0.083 0.038 0.083
Control 
Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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The results of instrumental variable regression of EPU 
and M&A are shown in Table 9. The results show that the 
first two columns in the table use the US EPU index as the 
IV. The results show that the EPU coefficient is still sig-
nificantly negative at the 1% level, and the baseline results 
are still valid. Using global EPU index and the EPU index 
weighted by the trade share of major trading countries of 
China as the IVs, the EPU coefficient is still significantly 
positive at the 1% level, that is, the positive relationship 
between EPU and M&A size has not changed.
(3) Sub-sample regression. Due to differences in re-
source endowments and policy intensity, China’s eco-
nomic development has long been confronted with the 
problem of regional imbalance. There are big differences 
in the developed degree of economy, financial market 
perfection and financial intermediary development in dif-
ferent regions. In the Robustness checks, this paper adopts 
the method of sub-sample regression to examine the influ-
ence of the relationship between EPU and M&A in differ-
ent regions. In this paper, the sample is divided into two 
sub-samples in the east and central west, and the reference 
model is regressed respectively. The empirical results are 
shown in Table 10. There are 17,900 samples from the 
eastern region and 8,293 samples from the central and 
western regions. The regression results in Table 10 show 
that the EPU coefficient is still statistically significant at 
the 1% level, that is, the previous conclusion has not sub-
stantially changed.
Table 10. Regression of Sub-samples: According to the 
Region of Company Address
Dependent 
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)










EPU 0.9814*** 1.2611*** 0.8859*** 0.9632***
(0.064) (0.158) (0.092) (0.209)
N 17,900 17,900 8,293 8,293
R2 0.047 0.097 0.032 0.061
Control 
Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes
According to the different degree of industry competi-
tion, this paper regresses the sample according to the sam-
ples with high and low degree of industry competition. We 
calculate the Herfindahl index based on total assets, and 
classify the industries whose Herfindahl index is lower 
than the median level into highly competitive industries, 
and those higher than the median level as less competitive 
industries. The empirical results are shown in Table 11. 
The results show that the EPU coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 1% level in industries with high or low 
degree of industry competition. The empirical results are 
still valid, namely, the previous conclusions are still valid.
Table 11. Regression of Sub-samples According to the 
Degree of Industry Competition
Dependent 
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)









EPU 0.9955*** 0.9564*** 1.1610*** 1.2610***
(0.078) (0.077) (0.204) (0.182)
N 13,029 13,167 13,029 13,167
R2 0.043 0.031 0.092 0.068
Control 
Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes
5. EPU and M&A Performance
Whether M&A can create corporate value and achieve a 
long-term increase in operating performance have always 
been a concern to both domestic and foreign scholars. 
Most existing studies argue that it is difficult to improve 
corporate performance through M&A. Specifically, taking 
China’s capital market as an example, most listed compa-
nies have negative excess returns when declaring M&A 
[14,23,24]. However, it is worth noting that under the premise 
that mergers and acquisitions cannot effectively improve 
corporate performance, the number of M&A deals and 
size of M&A deals are still showing an upward trend year 
by year. Studies have found that the strengthening of re-
source integration, the improvement of internal control 
means, and director ties will all have an impact on M&A 
performance. However, cultural differences, political con-
nections, and the size of acquirers will have a negative 
effect on M&A performance [8,16].
Whether a target company selected by the acquirer and 
the timing are appropriate are the main factors affecting 
M&A performance. The rise of EPU means that the vola-
tility of the financial market has risen, investor confidence 
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has fallen, and the future industry development trend is 
even more unclear. In the context of EPU enhancement, 
the market value of some listed companies is undervalued, 
which provides space for the acquirers to expand product 
line, improve market share and acquire core technologies 
through M&A. Therefore, in the short term, with the rise 
of EPU, the internalization of external financing, expan-
sion of production capacity and core technical capabilities 
brought by M&A can achieve the improvement of short-
term performance. However, in the long run, the friction 
between an acquiring party and an acquired party over 
cultural differences, personnel coordination and resource 
integration will have a negative impact on the production 
and operation activities of enterprises, thereby reducing 
operating performance. So, how will the rise of EPU 
affect M&A performance? Does this influence have het-
erogeneity in term. This paper will further discuss the 
impact of rising EPU on M&A performance. Drawing on 
the research of Wang and Li, the difference of the return 
on assets between 1 year and 3 years before and after the 
acquisition of the target company is used as the proxy 
indicator of the M&A performance, the effect of EPU rise 
on M&A performance was investigated by adding the 
interaction item of EPU and M&A (EPUt×MAi,t). The re-
sults are shown in Table 12. 





EPU*MAA 0.0001*** 0.0000 -0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EPU 0.0054*** 0.0109*** 0.0167***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
MAA -0.0002** -0.0001 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 22,810 16,613 11,562
R2 0.464 0.314 0.265
Control Vari-
ables Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes
Column (1) in Table 12 takes the difference of the re-
turn on assets 1 year after M&A and 1 years before M&A 
as the proxy indicator of M&A performance. The results 
show that the interaction term (EPU*MAA) between EPU 
and size of M&A deals is statistically significant at the 
1% level, indicating that the EPU will promote the im-
provement of short-term business performance. The last 
two columns in the table measure the M&A performance 
by the difference between the return on assets 2 and 3 
years before and after the merger. The results show that 
the EPU*MAA interaction coefficient is not significant, 
indicating that there is no positive effect of EPU on M&A 
performance in the long run.
6. Conclusion and Recommendations
This paper examines the impact of EPU on M&A behav-
ior. We found that the rise of EPU will promote M&A 
activities, and this effect is more significant in mature 
companies. The impact of EPU on size of M&A deals is 
affected by the level of corporate governance, stock price 
volatility, and financing constraints. Specifically, for a 
company with higher level of corporate governance and 
stock price volatility, and lesser financing constraints, its 
size of M&A deals is more sensitive to changes in EPU. 
Further study shows that the rise of EPU will promote the 
improvement of M&A performance in the short-term, but 
this effect is not significant in the long-term. 
We come to the following policy suggestions: First-
ly, the formulation of relevant economic and industrial 
policies of government sectors should fully consider the 
periodicity of the industries. For companies in different 
life stages, their M&A behavior has a different sensitiv-
ity to EPU. To better play the important role of M&A in 
resource allocation, when formulating relevant economic 
and industrial policies, government sectors should give 
full consideration to the characteristics of the industries 
in which enterprises are located, so as to better play the 
positive role of economic policies in adjusting industrial 
structure and enhancing economic vitality. Secondly, gov-
ernment sectors should stabilize investor expectations, im-
prove the effectiveness of the capital market, and strength-
en the information disclosure mechanism. The increase in 
EPU makes some companies more likely to be mispriced 
and viciously acquired, and emotional fluctuations of ex-
ternal investors will further amplify the above-mentioned 
effects. Therefore, how to guide investors to rationally 
anticipate, improve the effectiveness of the capital market, 
and strengthen the information disclosure mechanism in a 
period of high uncertainty in the foreign economic and fi-
nancial environment and China’s policy will have a strong 
role in achieving financial stability and promoting the 
development of high-tech industries. Financial regulatory 
authorities should further regulate M&A behavior, protect 
investors’ interests, strengthen education on investors, and 
improve the financial statement disclosure mechanism. 
Thirdly, the coordination, pertinence and effectiveness of 
policies should be enhanced so as to form a resultant force 
in supervision. The increase in EPU has caused banks’ re-
luctance to lend, which will raise corporate financing costs 
and affect the effectiveness of economic policy implemen-
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tation. Therefore, the formulation and implementation of 
policies by relevant departments should take full account 
of the coordination, coherence, and comprehensiveness of 
the policies, so as to promote the steady development of 
China’s real economy. Fourth, enterprises should improve 
the corporate governance levels, increase the effect of hu-
man resources and financial capital allocation, and restrain 
the negative impact of management’s opportunistic behav-
ior on business operations. Specifically, enterprises should 
continue to improve their own corporate governance, 
strengthen resource allocation and integration capabilities, 
and enhance the inclusiveness of internal culture to sup-
press the negative impact of management’s self-interested 
motivation on the business long-term value.
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Appendix Tables
Table 2. EPU and M&A
Dependent 
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MA MA MA MA
EPU 1.1530*** 2.0467*** 0.9619*** 1.1792***

















N 26,196 26,196 26,196 26,196
R2 0.032 0.069 0.040 0.083
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the industry level, which 
are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
Table 3. EPU and M&A: Sub-sample Test According to 
the Growth of Enterprises
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent 
Variable MA MA MA MA
Initial Stage Development Stage Initial Stage
Development 
Stage
EPU 0.7583*** 1.0621*** 0.7244*** 1.5188***
(0.079) (0.078) (0.191) (0.174)
Size 0.5968*** 0.7574*** 1.6129*** 1.2886***
(0.172) (0.173) (0.218) (0.212)
CF -0.1431 0.7061 -0.0810 0.2312
(0.767) (0.751) (0.763) (0.748)
TobinQ -0.0165 0.5157*** 0.3015*** 0.7913***
(0.077) (0.072) (0.085) (0.079)
lev 2.5070*** 3.4771*** 0.9889 2.6346***
(0.885) (0.771) (0.913) (0.768)
ROA 5.8601*** -0.1940 5.2113** 0.7164
(2.118) (1.930) (2.128) (1.894)
Salesg 0.2444 0.3878** 0.2559 0.5045***
(0.166) (0.184) (0.165) (0.189)
Return_Gap 0.0011* 0.0023*** 0.0011* 0.0024***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
risk_gap -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001** 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 12,876 12,856 12,876 12,856
R2 0.025 0.051 0.060 0.092
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the industry level, which 
are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
Table 4. EPU, Corporate Governance and M&A
Dependent 
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MA MA MA MA
EPU 0.7113*** 0.9919*** 0.3738*** 0.7843***
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Size 0.6514*** 1.4559*** 0.5939*** 1.3412***
(0.121) (0.153) (0.121) (0.153)
CF 0.4099 0.1361 0.4626 0.1450
(0.499) (0.499) (0.500) (0.499)
TobinQ 0.2977*** 0.6073*** 0.2773*** 0.5768***
(0.050) (0.054) (0.050) (0.054)
lev 2.9959*** 1.8633*** 2.8298*** 1.8502***
(0.555) (0.559) (0.553) (0.555)
ROA 1.0785 1.4002 1.6506 1.8962
(1.332) (1.311) (1.331) (1.313)
Salesg 0.4134*** 0.4492*** 0.3787*** 0.4290***
(0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116)
Return_Gap 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0018***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
risk_gap -0.0000 -0.0000* -0.0000 -0.0000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 26,196 26,196 26,196 26,196
R2 0.043 0.085 0.046 0.087
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the industry level, which 
are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
Table 5. EPU, Stock Price Volatility and M&A
Dependent 
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MA MA MA MA
EPU 0.5469*** 0.7563*** 0.5273*** 0.6969***
(0.075) (0.142) (0.078) (0.145)
VIX*EPU 0.3164*** 0.2462** 0.3419*** 0.2760***
(0.102) (0.100) (0.106) (0.104)
VIX -0.3199 -0.2252 -0.3484 -0.2633
(0.263) (0.260) (0.277) (0.273)
Size 0.2117 0.9121*** 0.1463 0.8795***
(0.140) (0.171) (0.144) (0.177)
CF -1.0488* -0.9636* -1.1705** -1.0949*
(0.564) (0.567) (0.579) (0.582)
TobinQ 0.0430 0.2131*** 0.0290 0.2186***
(0.058) (0.063) (0.061) (0.066)
lev 3.3227*** 2.1449*** 3.5321*** 2.3520***
(0.648) (0.667) (0.673) (0.692)
ROA 8.3899*** 8.1557*** 9.3341*** 9.0704***
(1.484) (1.471) (1.520) (1.505)
Salesg 0.0392 0.1077 0.0470 0.1063
(0.122) (0.122) (0.124) (0.124)
Return_Gap 0.0020*** 0.0020*** 0.0020*** 0.0020***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
risk_gap -0.0000* -0.0001* -0.0000* -0.0001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 20,002 20,002 18,567 18,567
R2 0.020 0.048 0.019 0.046
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the industry level, which 
are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
Table 6. EPU, Financing Constraints and M&A
Dependent 
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MA MA MA MA
EPU 1.4729*** 1.6310*** 0.8410*** 1.0298***
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(0.047) (0.047)
Size 0.6594*** 1.4854*** 0.6917*** 1.5384***
(0.121) (0.153) (0.121) (0.152)
CF 0.4584 0.0888 0.3575 0.0879
(0.515) (0.513) (0.499) (0.499)
TobinQ 0.3533*** 0.6354*** 0.2911*** 0.6094***
(0.065) (0.068) (0.050) (0.054)
lev 3.9059*** 2.2744*** 2.6652*** 1.3209*
(0.772) (0.780) (0.693) (0.700)
ROA 0.7169 1.1986 0.8111 1.0524
(1.359) (1.330) (1.336) (1.312)
Salesg 0.3437*** 0.4110*** 0.3965*** 0.4171***
(0.122) (0.120) (0.117) (0.117)
Return_Gap 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0019***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
risk_gap -0.0000 -0.0000* -0.0000 -0.0000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 26,196 26,196 26,196 26,196
R2 0.042 0.084 0.041 0.084
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Table 7. Alternative dependent variables
Dependent 
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MAD MAD MAD MAD
EPU 0.1832*** 0.3781*** 0.2002*** 0.3910***

















N 26,196 26,196 26,196 26,196
R2 0.094 0.0336 0.0186 0.0446
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the industry level, which 
are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
Table 8. Replace the Measurement Method of EPU Index
Dependent 
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MA MA MA MA
EPU_12M 0.6040*** 0.8199*** 0.5482*** 0.4724***

















R2 0.048 0.069 0.057 0.083
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the industry level, which 
are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
MA MA MA MA
EPU 0.8970*** 6.4008*** 1.3289*** 6.4008***
(0.053) (0.196) (0.089) (0.196)
Size 0.7496*** 1.5158*** 0.2861** 1.5158***
(0.102) (0.121) (0.127) (0.121)
CF 0.4293 0.1212 0.1471 0.1212
(0.483) (0.474) (0.486) (0.474)
TobinQ 0.3027*** 0.6239*** 0.3094*** 0.6239***
(0.047) (0.051) (0.047) (0.051)
lev 3.0853*** 1.9788*** 3.5578*** 1.9788***
(0.506) (0.499) (0.512) (0.499)
ROA 0.5468 1.0059 1.8608 1.0059
(1.256) (1.239) (1.276) (1.239)
Salesg 0.4117*** 0.4467*** 0.4443*** 0.4467***
(0.110) (0.109) (0.111) (0.109)
Return_Gap 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0019***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
risk_gap -0.0000 -0.0000* -0.0000 -0.0000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 26,096 26,096 26,096 26,096
R2 0.040 0.083 0.038 0.083
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes





Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the industry level, which 
are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
Table 10. Regression of Sub-samples: According to the 
Region of Company Address
Dependent 
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)










EPU 0.9814*** 1.2611*** 0.8859*** 0.9632***
(0.064) (0.158) (0.092) (0.209)
Size 0.8298*** 1.6635*** 0.4437** 1.2793***
(0.154) (0.187) (0.199) (0.261)
CF 1.7508*** 1.3586** -1.9618** -2.0573**
(0.597) (0.595) (0.893) (0.897)
TobinQ 0.2486*** 0.5874*** 0.3771*** 0.6495***
(0.061) (0.066) (0.087) (0.094)
lev 2.5037*** 1.3448* 4.0431*** 2.7907***
(0.695) (0.695) (0.912) (0.939)
ROA -2.8381* -1.4134 7.1279*** 5.4745**
(1.667) (1.618) (2.237) (2.266)
Salesg 0.6098*** 0.6421*** 0.1157 0.1244
(0.153) (0.152) (0.178) (0.180)
Return_
Gap 0.0018*** 0.0016*** 0.0024*** 0.0025***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
risk_gap -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.047 0.097 0.032 0.061
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the industry level, which 
are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
Table 11. Regression of Sub-samples According to the 
Degree of Industry Competition
Dependent 
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)









EPU 0.9955*** 0.9564*** 1.1610*** 1.2610***
(0.078) (0.077) (0.204) (0.182)
Size 0.7517*** 0.5274*** 1.6493*** 1.3342***
(0.181) (0.194) (0.232) (0.248)
CF 0.9612 -0.0313 0.6826 -0.2534
(0.703) (0.729) (0.701) (0.732)
TobinQ 0.1364** 0.4553*** 0.4618*** 0.7508***
(0.069) (0.080) (0.077) (0.086)
lev 3.7783*** 2.5901*** 2.3234*** 1.6230*
(0.842) (0.838) (0.850) (0.852)
ROA -1.3109 2.2689 -0.2471 2.4922
(1.867) (1.990) (1.807) (1.987)
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Salesg 0.2791* 0.5174*** 0.3488** 0.5214***
(0.162) (0.175) (0.164) (0.174)
Return_Gap 0.0022*** 0.0016** 0.0021*** 0.0016**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
risk_gap -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 13,029 13,167 13,029 13,167
R2 0.043 0.031 0.092 0.068
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the industry level, which 
are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.




EPU*MAA 0.0001*** 0.0000 -0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EPU 0.0054*** 0.0109*** 0.0167***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
MAA -0.0002** -0.0001 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Size -0.0174*** -0.0253*** -0.0294***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
CF -0.0060 -0.0353*** -0.0404***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
lev 0.0818*** 0.0791*** 0.0741***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
ROA 0.8419*** 0.5474*** 0.3970***
(0.016) (0.013) (0.013)
Salesg 0.0125*** 0.0137*** 0.0124***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Return_Gap 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
risk_gap -0.0000*** -0.0000 -0.0000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 22,810 16,613 11,562
R2 0.464 0.314 0.265
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes
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